18 KiB
Live tests in a lab
The tests in this folder run the module against a Windows file server with
domain accounts, in an AutomatedLab lab. They cover
the cases that depend on the file server or on the accounts, which the tests in
Tests can't cover: those run on one computer, against local folders, with
local and well-known accounts. CI doesn't run the tests in this folder, and
without a lab they skip every test.
Cases
| Case | Role | What the tests check |
|---|---|---|
| 1, #34 | Delegate | Add-NTFSAccess, Remove-NTFSAccess, Clear-NTFSAccess, Disable-NTFSAccessInheritance, Enable-NTFSAccessInheritance, Set-NTFSInheritance, and Set-NTFSSecurityDescriptor on share folders that Administrators own and on which a domain group has Full Control, run by a member of that group who isn't an administrator of the file server. They succeed and keep the owner. |
| 2 | Admin, ServerAdmin, Delegate | Get-NTFSAudit, Add-NTFSAudit, and Remove-NTFSAudit on share folders. Over SMB, the file server checks the Security privilege of the account. The administrators of the file server read and change the audit entries; the delegated account gets the errors that the cmdlet pages describe, and the folders stay unchanged. |
| 3 | Admin, ServerAdmin, Delegate | Get-NTFSEffectiveAccess for a domain account with rights through two nested domain groups and through a local group of the file server. With -ServerName, the result includes the local group, without a warning; without it, the client doesn't know that group. With an unreachable server, the cmdlet falls back to the client and warns. The authorization manager of the file server refuses the delegated account, which isn't an administrator there, and the cmdlet reports that as an error, not as no access. The administrator of the file server who isn't an administrator of the client gets the result of the client without -ServerName and for the name of the client, because the local authorization manager of the client answers when the remote one refuses a user who isn't its administrator. |
| 4 | Admin | Get-NTFSOrphanedAccess returns the entry of a deleted domain account with its SID, on the folder and as inherited entry on a file in it; Get-NTFSOrphanedAudit returns the audit entry of that account. |
| 5 | Admin, ServerAdmin, Delegate | Get-NTFSOwner and Set-NTFSOwner on share folders that Administrators own. Every role makes itself the owner; only the administrators of the file server, which hold the Restore privilege there, assign another account. The delegated account gets a SetOwnerError, and the owner stays. |
| 6 | Admin, ServerAdmin, Delegate | Disable-NTFSAuditInheritance, Enable-NTFSAuditInheritance, Clear-NTFSAudit, and Get-NTFSInheritance on share folders that inherit an audit entry. The administrators of the file server change the audit entries; the delegated account gets the errors that the cmdlet pages describe, and Get-NTFSInheritance reports no audit state for it. |
| 7 | Delegate | Get-Item2, Test-Path2, Get-FileHash2, Copy-Item2, Move-Item2, Remove-Item2, and Get-ChildItem2 in a share folder, including the first hidden file with -Hidden and without explicit -Force. |
| 8 | Admin | New-NTFSHardLink, Get-NTFSHardLink, and New-NTFSSymbolicLink in a share folder. Windows can't list the names of a file on a share, so Get-NTFSHardLink and New-NTFSHardLink -PassThru write the GetHardLinkError that their pages describe. |
| 9 | Delegate, Admin | Get-NTFSSimpleAccess compares a share folder with its parent. For the accounts of another domain and of other forests, Get-NTFSAccess returns their names, Get-NTFSOrphanedAccess doesn't report them, Add-NTFSAccess and Remove-NTFSAccess find them by name, and Get-NTFSEffectiveAccess -ServerName returns the rights that the file server's own token of each account gets. |
| Long paths | Admin | Get-ChildItem2 and Get-NTFSAccess with a share path longer than 260 characters. |
| #108 | Admin | Copy-Item2 and Move-Item2 with -WhatIf onto an existing file on the share write no error. |
| 10 | Delegate, ServerAdmin, Admin | The behavior that the quality-gate fixes before 5.0.0 changed, and that the lab can observe. The delegated account, which owns the items it creates, clears and protects the DACL of an item whose OWNER RIGHTS entry denies it the right to change the DACL, and the cmdlets report no RestoreOwnerError for the unchanged owner. InheritedFrom names an unknown parent for entries that Windows can't resolve, for a deleted file and below a folder whose permissions the account can't read, and no source for an explicit entry. A later command that stops the pipeline with Select-Object -First 1 or throws leaves the second item of Remove-Item2, Copy-Item2, Move-Item2, Set-NTFSOwner, and Set-NTFSSecurityDescriptor as it was, also when it takes the verbose messages of Set-NTFSSecurityDescriptor or the debug messages of Set-NTFSOwner, and Get-FileHash2 writes no error when it takes its verbose messages. Get-ChildItem2 passes on what a later command throws for the error of a folder it can't read, and a break of that command leaves the caller's loop. Get-ChildItem2 -Filter finds a name with brackets, returns every item for *.*, and rejects $null. The privileges that the cmdlets enable are disabled again when a later command stops the pipeline or throws at a debug message. |
| State | Server | After the runs on the client, the file server checks the owners, the audit entries, the items, the links, the entries of the foreign accounts, and which items a later command changed, itself, without the module. |
Case 1 uses two kinds of folders. Before 5.0.0-rc3, the cmdlets wrote back the
owner that Windows returns with a DACL without the auto-inherit flag, and the
file server refused it with error 1307, "This security ID may not be assigned
as the owner of this object". Windows sets that flag whenever it writes a DACL
with SetNamedSecurityInfo, so the fixture stores the DACL of one kind of
folders again with SetFileSecurity, without the flag, like tools that predate
Windows 2000. Set-NTFSSecurityDescriptor wrote the owner on both kinds.
The expected rights of case 3 come from the tokens that the file server and the client create for the account with a Kerberos S4U logon, the way the Effective Access tab of the advanced security settings does. Case 9 calculates the rights of the foreign accounts the same way, on the file server.
Roles
| Role | Account | Administrator of the client | Administrator of the file server |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delegate | NtfsLiveDelegate, member of NtfsLiveDelegates |
Yes | No |
| ServerAdmin | NtfsLiveServerAdmin, member of Remote Management Users on the client |
No | Yes |
| Admin | NtfsLiveAdmin |
Yes | Yes |
| Server | The installation account of the lab, on the file server | Yes | Yes |
The script also creates the account of case 3, NtfsLiveSubject followed by
four digits, which is a member of NtfsLiveInner, a member of NtfsLiveOuter,
and of the local group NtfsLiveLocal of the file server, and NtfsLiveOrphan,
which it deletes in every run. For case 9, it creates NtfsLiveForeign in the
organizational unit NTFSSecurityLive of each domain of
-ForeignDomainController.
A new fixture gets a new name for the account of case 3. In the matrix lab, the
authorization managers that Get-NTFSEffectiveAccess asks for a remote computer
(the one of the client by the default -ServerName, the one of the file server
by its name) answered for about ten minutes as if an account had no groups when
the account was deleted and created again under the same name, so cells that
followed each other failed in the effective-access tests, whichever version of
the module ran. The Kerberos logon that the tests use as the oracle, and the
local authorization manager, were right in the same second. The mechanism in
Windows isn't known (see the record of the operating-system matrix). A fixture
that exists keeps its account, so the runs of one fixture use one name.
Lab
The lab needs a domain controller, a file server, and a client of one domain,
PowerShell 7 and Pester 5.7.1 on the client and the file server, and
remoting with CredSSP from the host, which AutomatedLab sets up. The defaults
use the lab of
WindowsAccessControl, which
tests/Lab/Deploy-WindowsAccessControlLab.ps1 in that repository deploys:
F1ADC1 as domain controller, F1AFile2 as file server, and F1AFile1 as
client, all in a.forest1.net. -DomainController, -FileServer, and
-Client select other machines. Case 9 uses F1BDC1 of b.forest1.net, a
domain of the same forest, and F2DC1 and F3DC1 of the forests
forest2.net and forest3.net, which have forest trusts with forest1.net;
-ForeignDomainController @() leaves it out.
The operating-system matrix has a lab of its own, NtfsSecurityOsMatrixLab,
on the same host. Acceptance\Deploy-OsMatrixLab.ps1 deploys it in AutomatedLab
without touching another lab: OSDC1 (Windows Server 2025), the domain
controller of the domain osmatrix.net, the file servers OSFile19,
OSFile22, and OSFile25 (Windows Server 2019, 2022, and 2025), the client
OSWin11E (Windows 11 Enterprise Evaluation 22H2), and OSWin11 (Windows 11 Pro
26H1), on a switch of their own, 192.168.12.0/24. OSWin11 can't keep a
secure channel to the domain controller, so it runs the suite of the module
only (Run-MatrixLocalSuite.ps1, below). The evaluation image of OSWin11E
shuts down an hour after each start, because its license period has ended: start
it shortly before a run and keep a run under an hour. The lab has no trust with
another forest, so case 9 runs only in the first lab and the matrix runs use
-ForeignDomainController @().
The script adds to the lab:
- the organizational unit
NTFSSecurityLivewith the accounts and groups, and withNtfsLiveForeignin the domains of the foreign domain controllers - the local group
NtfsLiveLocaland members of Administrators on the file server, and members of Administrators and Remote Management Users on the client - the share
NTFSSecurityLiveonC:\NTFSSecurityLiveof the file server, with a folder for each run - the folder
C:\NTFSSecurityLabwith the tests on the file server, and with the modules and the tests on the client
Run the tests
In an elevated Windows PowerShell 5.1 session on the Hyper-V host of the lab:
.\Tests\Lab\Invoke-NTFSSecurityLabTest.ps1 -Version 5.0.0-rc2, 5.0.0-rc4 -Confirm:$false
The script downloads each version from the PowerShell Gallery, checks the hash
that the gallery publishes, and runs the tests for each version in Windows
PowerShell 5.1 and PowerShell 7. Each version runs in its own process, because
all versions of NTFSSecurity.dll have the same assembly version. To test a
build, add -ModulePath .\NTFSSecurity\bin\Release; it runs as the version
local.
The script sets new random passwords for the accounts in every call and keeps them in memory only. The tests refuse to run on a computer other than the client and the file server of the configuration, and on a folder outside the share.
Remove everything the script added to the lab:
.\Tests\Lab\Invoke-NTFSSecurityLabTest.ps1 -RemoveFixture
Results
Each call writes to a new folder in $env:TEMP\NTFSSecurityLab\Results:
Summary.mdandSummary.json: the counts per version, edition, and role, and the failed tests with their messages<run>-<role>.result.jsonand<run>-<role>.log: the result and the error message of each test that ran, and the output of Pester<run>.json: the configuration of the run<run>-State.json: the stored owner, group, and DACL, and the SACL of each folder after the run
A version before 5.0.0-rc3 fails case 1 with error 1307, a version before
5.0.0-rc4 fails the tests of #108, a version before 5.0.0-rc5 fails the
test of case 3 with a computer that can't be reached: it returned no access
instead of the result of the client. A version before 5.0.0-rc6 fails two
tests of case 8: Get-NTFSHardLink and New-NTFSHardLink -PassThru stopped
on the share with the terminating error (50). A build without the fixes of the
quality gate before 5.0.0 fails case 10 and the matching test of the State
role: 74 of the 244 tests of each edition (see the
record of that run).
Acceptance of a release candidate
Before a release, run the live tests once more under controlled conditions and record the evidence in this folder:
- Build the candidate once, package it with
.github\scripts\New-ModulePackage.ps1, and record the SHA-256 of the packages and of the module files. - Check that WinRM, LDAP, Kerberos, the secure channel, and the clocks of the lab machines work.
- Take a checkpoint of the machines, named after the candidate and its commit.
- Run the tests with
-ModulePathof the extractedNTFSSecurity.zipin both editions. - Remove the fixture with
-RemoveFixtureand check that its accounts, share, folders, group memberships, and profiles are gone.
A run with -ModulePath validates a build. The acceptance of a release is the
run with -Version of the exact prerelease on the PowerShell Gallery, as
Docs\Contributing\05-Releasing.md describes. The scripts in the folder
Acceptance support it, and each runs in Windows PowerShell 5.1 on
the host:
Test-PublishedRelease.ps1 -Version <version> -OutputPath <folder>checks a published version and changes nothing: the tag and its commit onmaster, the CI run of the tag, the SHA-512 that the PowerShell Gallery publishes against the downloaded package, and the module files of the package against those of the GitHub zip file.Validate-LabResults.ps1checks every role of a controller run from the result files, not from the markerDONEthat the controller writes also when tests failed.Run-MatrixSequence.ps1runs steps 2, 4, and 5 for each file server of the matrix lab with the clientOSWin11E: it checks the readiness of every machine (Test-MatrixReadiness.ps1), runs the controller in both editions, validates every role, removes the fixture, and checks the end state independently (Test-MatrixCleanup.ps1, which takes the lab name and the machines, so it checks the first lab as well;-Mode Repairremoves what a failed cleanup left).Run-MatrixLocalSuite.ps1runs the Pester files of the module on a machine of the matrix lab, or on the host as the reference, in both editions, elevated and as a basic user, and copies the results back. Run it with a candidate before the controller: a test that passes on a computer outside a domain can fail on a computer in a domain, as the effective-access tests of the basic user did.Export-MatrixResults.ps1turns the results into tables.Probe-EffectiveAccess.ps1asksGet-NTFSEffectiveAccessthe same questions under the token of an administrator, a filtered administrator, a local standard user, and a standard domain user, and shows which authorization manager answers or refuses.Probe-AccountRecreation.ps1deletes an account and creates it again with the same name in a loop. It shows the SID and the groups that Kerberos S4U logons report on the domain controller, the client, and the file server, and whatGet-NTFSEffectiveAccessof each module under test returns. It showed the state that the controller avoids with a new name for the account of case 3.Export-CellTimeline.ps1reads the sequence and run logs of controller cells and writes one row for every cell, edition, and role: the module, the account and its relative ID, the times of the removal of the previous fixture, of the creation of the accounts, and of the Admin role, and the three effective-access tests.Test-StaleAuthzModel.ps1replays such a timeline against the model of the failures of the effective-access tests (an authorization manager that answers for an account name from its first request, for some minutes, also after the account was created again) and reports, for the lifetimes that predict most outcomes, how many of the observed ones the model reproduces. With-Lifetimeit lists every run with the observed and the predicted outcome for that one lifetime, with-AsIfSameSubjectit shows where a controller that reuses the account name would have met a stale entry, and with-Permutationshow often a random assignment of the outcomes fits as well. It describes the observations; it doesn't explain Windows.Add-OsMatrixMachine.ps1,Complete-OsMatrixLab.ps1, andRepair-OsMatrixBoot.ps1add a machine to the deployed lab, install the tools on the machines (the VMs have no internet), and repair the boot files of a base image that the host couldn't write.Probe-LaterCommand.ps1is the diagnostic of the record of the paths fixes.
Records: 5.0.0-rc6, 5.0.0-rc7, quality-gate follow-up, quality-gate paths follow-up, and operating-system matrix. The review of the code that no unit test visits, with the fixes that the lab has to repeat, is in Tests/Coverage.
Files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
Invoke-NTFSSecurityLabTest.ps1 |
Prepares the lab, runs the tests, and writes the results; runs on the host. |
NTFSSecurity.Live.Tests.ps1 |
The tests; run on the client and the file server. |
Start-NTFSSecurityLiveTest.ps1 |
Runs the tests of one role in a new process. |
NTFSSecurity.LabHelpers.ps1 |
Reads and writes security descriptors as Windows stores them, and calculates the expected rights. |
Acceptance\ |
The scripts of the acceptance of a candidate or of a published version, and the diagnostic of the paths record (see above). |